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We consider mathematically the problem of generating random bit-sequences from physical 
noise sources (such as zener diodes). We propose a very general mathematical model for such 
physical sources: the semi-random source, and show how to convert the output of such sources 
into quasi-random sequences. Such sequences are indistinguishable from truly random ones in 
a strong sense. This enables us to prove that quasi-random sequences can be used in place 
of truly random ones for applications such as seeds for pseudo-random number generators, 
randomizing algorithms, and stochastic simulation experiments. ic’ 1986 Academic Press, Inc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Several computational applications require a source of “random bit-sequences.” 
These include randomizing algorithms (the most well known are for primality 
testing [ 10, 131) stochastic simulation [ 11, 61, simulated annealing [7], cryp- 
tography [3], and others [IS]. Ideally, for these applications one would like to have 
sequences of unbiased and independent bits. Unfortunately, the available physical 
sources of randomness (including zener diodes and geiger counters) are imperfect 
[IS]. Their output bits are not only biased but also correlated. 
In this paper we initiate a mathematical approach to this problem of generating 
random bit-sequences from imperfect physical noise sources. We introduce a very 
general mathematical model for the physical source and an algorithm to convert the 
output of such sources into bit-sequences that are provably good for computational 
applications including those listed above. In our model the output is produced by 
flipping a coin whose bias (probability of 1) is variable. The bias of the next output 
bit is selected by an adversary with infinite computing power, and complete 
knowledge of the output sequence generated so far. To make sure that the source 
does generate some randomness, the adversary is limited to picking a bias greater 
than 6 and smaller than 1 - 6, for some positive fraction 0 < 6 < 1. This models the 
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known practical sources of randomness such as the zener diode, in which the fre- 
quency of O’s and l’s “drifts” over a period of time. We shall call such an adversary 
source a semi-random source. ’ 
The simplest model of an imperfect source of randomness is a coin whose bias is 
unknown, but fixed. von Neumann [9] proposed a very simple real-time algorithm 
to extract unbiased flips from such a biased coin. Blum [l] generalized this model 
to any deterministic finite state Markov process, whose underlying state transition 
diagram is given, but whose transition probabilities are unknown. Such a Markov 
process may be regarded as flipping a coin whose bias depends upon the state of the 
Markov process, thus causing the output bits to be correlated. Blum showed that 
the obvious generalization of the von Neumann procedure does not work, but sur- 
prisingly enough, changing the order in which the bits are output yields unbiased, 
independent bits. The model introduced in this paper assumes nothing about the 
underlying mechanism of the source (instead the mechanism is represented by a 
malicious adversary); the only requirement is that there must be a small amount of 
uncertainty about each output bit. 
The adversary nature of our model distinguishes our approach from information 
theory. Shannon’s coding theorem says roughly that from any source one may 
extract as many independent unbiased bits as the entropy of the source (this is the 
best that one could hope to do). By contrast, we prove that there is no algorithm 
that can extract even a single unbiased bit from a semi-random source (in fact, 
no better than a 1 -6 biased bit). This difference stems from the following distinc- 
tion: the slightly random source with parameter 6 specifies a certain large class of 
distributions; the output distribution of the source is picked from this class of 
distributions by a malicious adversary. Whereas Shannon’s theorem says that for 
any distribution there is a good algorithm for extracting unbiased, independent bits, 
we show that no bit extracting algorithm is uniformly good for every semi-random 
distribution with parameter 6. 
On the positive side we show how to extract quasi-random sequences from the 
outputs of independent semi-random sources. These quasi-random sequences may 
not be truly independent or unbiased, but are provably indistinguishable from truly 
random sequences in a very strong sense (even stronger than that of Yao [ 161). A 
consequence of this indistinguishability is that truly random sequences can be 
replaced by quasi-random sequences in all the usual computational applications of 
random sequences. As an example, we shall prove that quasi-random sequences can 
be used instead of truly random coin flips to generate random variates for 
stochastic simulation experiments. We show how to extract n bit quasi-random 
sequences from o(log n) independent semi-random sources: the algorithm is 
efficient, uses no storage, and is suitable for hardware implementation. 
The semi-random source model was motivated by its conceptual simplicity. Why 
is it necessary to give a worst-case model for a physical noise source? Our underly- 
’ In a preliminary version of this paper [17], such sources were referred to as slightly random sources. 
Here, we shall use the more appropriate terminology, semi-random source. 
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ing assumption is that the exact nature of the correlations in the output of the 
source depends upon the details of the physical mechanism of the source; these 
details are not only hard to determine, but are not time invariant; they depend 
upon the operating conditions such as temperature and humidity. Thus the problem 
of designing a noise diode with small corelation in its output bits is hard, and the 
most effective method is to sample the output of the diode at a slow rate. The 
results of this paper indicate that a radically different approach is viable: sample the 
output of the diode frequently, thereby getting correlated but semi-random bits. 
Then extract quasi-random sequences from the outputs of several independent noise 
diodes: the hardware cost is small, and to generate an n-bit quasi-random sequence, 
o(( 1/6)n) semi-random bits are required. The engineering design effort must now 
focus upon ensuring independence of the w(( l/6) log n) noise diodes. Thus the 
advantages of this approach are twofold: the first is the potential speedup due to 
faster sampling rates; the second is that electromagnetic isolation of the noise 
diodes (to ensure independence) is a relatively well understood and tractable 
problem. 
Finally, let us compare the approaches to generating random bit-sequences: sam- 
pling physical noise versus pseudo-random generation by deterministic methods 
[S]. The pseudo-random approach has the advantage that no special circuitry is 
required, and the repeatability is useful for debugging programs. However, one 
problem with this approach is the unproven statistical properties of the sequences 
(this problem becomes apparent only as the applications become more 
sophisticated). Finally, random sequences can be obtained at (potentially) faster 
speed by sampling physical sources (see [9], for example). The pioneering work of 
Shamir, Blum-Micali, Yao [12, 2, 161 has led to the theory of perfect pseudo- 
random number generators, which have provably good statistical properties 
provided that one-way functions exist. Blum [ 1 ] points out that the random seed 
for such a generator must be picked with extra care because of the danger that the 
pseudo-random number generator might amplify any dependence or bias in the bits 
of the seed. We shall prove that quasi-random sequences can be used as seeds for 
perfect pseudo-random number generators, without weakening the cryptographic 
security of the generator. 
2. QUASI-RANDOMNESS 
We are given a source which for every length n, generates n-length strings 
x E (0, 1 }” with some probability p,(x). 
DEFINITION 1. A source is a quasi-random generator if for every t > 0, and for 
sufficiently large n: 1 C,,, =n p,(x) - l/2”/ < l/n’. 
The definition of the quasi-random generator was originally motivated by the 
concept of the probabilistic polynomial statistical test and of the perfect pseudo- 
random number generator introduced by Yao [16]. Below, we give a second, 
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equivalent definition of a quasi-random generator, which is more in the spirit of 
Yao’s definitions, and allows us to compare the two notions: quasi-randomness and 
pseudo-randomness. 
DEFINITION. A functional statistical test is any function f: (0, 1 }* -+ [0, 11, 
where [0, l] denotes the unit interval. 
Let phn) = l/2” C,,, =n f(x), be the average value of f on random n-length 
strings. Let p?(n) = C,,, =” p,(x) f(x), be the average value off on n-length strings 
generated by the source. 
DEFINITION 2. A source is a quasi-random generator if for every t > 0, for suf- 
ficiently large n, and for every functional statistical test f: Ipr(n) - ,uF(n)l < l/n’. 
THEOREM 1. The two definitions of a quasi-random generator are equivalent. 
Proof Consider a source which satisfies Definition 1, and let f be a functional 
statistical test. Then for all t, and for all large enough n, 
Thus the source is a quasi-random generator also according to Definition 2. 
To prove the converse, let 





$ > P,,(x) 
0 otherwise. 
Let L(x) = 1 -g(x). Then 
1 .F,, Ipn@-k~ = I@4 - &%)I + h(n) -d(n) 
= 0( l/n’) + 0( l/n’) 
= 0( l/n’) for every t > 0. Q.E.D. 
Let us recall that a pseudo-random number generator is a polynomial time com- 
putable function G: (0, I}* + (0, 1 >*, such that for some polynomial poly(n), on 
n-length seeds G generates poly(n)-length sequences. 
DEFINITION [Yao]. A probabilistic polynomial time statistical test is a function 
T: { 0, 1 } * --+ (0, 1 }, which is computed by a probabilistic polynomial time Turing 
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machine. A pseudo-random number generator passes a probabilistic polynomial 
time statistical test T, if for every t > 0, for sufficiently large n, 
I~~(poly(n)) - pLTS ,Jn)l < l/r+. A pseudo-random number generator is perfect if it 
passes all probabilistic polynomial time statistical tests. 
An obvious difference between Yao’s statistical tests, and our functional 
statistical tests is that the function f need not be efficiently computable; it need not 
be computable at all. A more fundamental difference between these two notions 
arises from the fact that whereas the probabilistic polynomial statistical test is a 
complexity theoretic notion, the functional statistical test is an information 
theoretic notion. For this reason, Yao’s definition of a perfect pseudo-random num- 
ber generator is not uniform in the following sense: a pseudo-random number 
generator is perfect if for any r > 0, and any probabilistic polynomial time statistical 
test there is some seed length n, which satisfies the definition. In general this value n 
depends on the statistical test, and no finite value n will satisfy the definition with 
respect to all statistical tests. On the other hand quasi-randomness is a uniform 
concept: for any t > 0, a length n can be picked so that the n-length quasi-random 
sequences satisfy the definition relative to every functional statistical test. 
An easy consequence of the equivalent Definition 2 of a quasi-random source is 
that a perfect pseudo-random number generator remains perfect when the seeds are 
generated by a quasi-random source. The following theorem also illustrates how the 
strong properties of quasi-random generators allow them to replace truly random 
sequences. We show that quasi-random sequences can be used in place of sequences 
of coin flips by any procedure that generates (random variates of) a desired dis- 
tribution 7 from a sequence of coin flips. Let f: (0, 1 }* + Z, the set of integers. 
Given a probability distribution Pr on (0, 1 >“, f induces a probability distribution 
on Z in a natural way as follows: p,,(y) = x,,, =n,l,.Xj=J Pr(x). Let e be the desired 
distribution. As a measure of the closeness with which z is approximated by the dis- 
tribution induced by the function f, let ~1, = &EZ IT( y) - p,,( y)l. Intuitively, r,, 
measures the area between the density plots of the two distributions. 
THEOREM 2. Let f be any function as above; let p,, be the probability density 
induced by f when all n length strings are picked with uniform probability, and let q,, 
be the probability density induced by f when the n length strings are generated by a 
quasi-random generator. Let E,* = CyEz IT(Y)-q,,(Y)l. Then la,---a,*\ -c l/n’, for 
every t, for sufficiently large n. 
Comment. The above theorem can be used to get effective bounds: given a 
bound, one can compute n so that the error (the area between the two density 
plots) introduced by substituting quasi-random sequences for truly random ones is 
less than the bound. This value of n, is guaranteed to work regardless of the 
algorithm used for generating the random variates, because of the uniformity 
property. The fact that functional statistical tests in the definition of quasi-random- 
ness are not required to be polynomial time tests is also very important in this 
571’33’l.h 
80 SANTHA 
theorem. This is because the running 
tributions has not been analyzed, and 
Proof: Let 
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time of algorithms for producing some dis- 
may well be super-polynomial. 
if P~UIX)) > 4nU14)~ 
otherwise. 




c (Pn(Y)-qq,(Y))+ c (4AY) - P,(Y)) 
YE-Z P.(Y)>Y”(Y) YCZ. 4”(Y)2P”(Y) 
= b/l(n) - PrTe)l + IP&) - ,qWl 
= O( l/n’) + 0( l/n’) 
= O( l/n’) for every t > 0. 
Finally 
ka?Y=1 c b(Y)-Pn(Y)l- c lW%h4~ 
YEZ y E z 
Q c II~(Y)-Pn(Y)l- I~(V)-9,(Y)lI 
YE z 
6 c IPn(Y)-cJn(Y)l 
.” E z 
= O( l/n’) for every t > 0. Q.E.D. 
3. EXTRACTING QUASI-RANDOM SEQUENCES FROM SEMI-RANDOM SOURCES 
We first give a precise definition of a slightly random source. 
DEFINITION. A probability distribution on (0, 1 }” is slightly random if there 
exists a constant 6, 0 < 6 < f, such that for every i and for every string s of length 
i- 1, 
6<Pr[x,= 1 Ix1 . . . Xi& 1 = s] < 1 - 6. 
A semi-random source is one whose output probability distribution is semi-random. 
It is convenient to regard a semi-random source as a process, controlled by an 
adversary, which generates a sequence of O’s and l’s by flipping a coin of variable 
bias. The bias of the next coin flip depends upon the outcome of the previous coin 
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flips. We shall call the function describing this dependence the strategy adopted by 
the adversary. More formally, 
DEFINITION. A strategy for the adversary is a map S: (0, 1 }* + [S, 1 - S], 
where S(x) = Pr[next bit is 11 the string x has been output so far]. 
The following lemma shows how to get a single high quality bit from the output 
of o(log n) independent slightly random sources: 
LEMMA 3. Let x,, x2,..., x, be single bit outputs of m independent semi-random 
sources. Then 
(Pr [parity(x, , x1 ,..., x,) = 1 ] - Pr[parity(x,, x2,..., x,) = 0] 1 < (1 - 26)%. 
Proof. By induction on m. Let 
ri = Pr[parity(x,, x2 ,..., xi) = 11, 
and 
si= Pr[parity(x,, x2 ,..., xi) = l] = 1 - ri. 
Let 
p=Pr[xm= 11, q=l-p. 
Then S < p, q < 1 - 6. Since the sources are independent, 
Therefore 
Ir,-sml=I(rm~I-sm-I)(p-q)1Q(1-26)m-1(1-26)=(1-26)m. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 3 shows how to use independence between the two sources to get a high 
quality bit: specifically take m = O(( l/6) log n); then the parity bit has bias in 
[4 - l/nocl), f + l/n”“‘]. 
So far we have only used (single) bits from independent sources. Next, we show 
that generating these high quality output bits is the key to thwarting the adver- 
saries. 
Consider the following “high-quality” source: The sequences of length n are 
generated by a coin C, whose bias can be slightly changed after each flip, with the 
constraint that the bias must be greater than $-s(n) and less than 4 + E(n). Before 
each flip of this coin, an adversary, who has knowledge of the history of the coin 
flips sets the bias of the coin. The purpose of the adversary is to create as much 
dependence in the distribution of flip sequences as possible. We would like to show 
that if e(n) is a sufficiently small function of n, then this source is quasi-random. 
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THEOREM 4. If for every t and for all sufficiently large n, I < l/n’, then the 
source defined above is quasi-random. 
ProoJ For any n-length string x = s1 . .. s, and for every i, 1 6 i < n, let 
Pr(sil s1 ... si- 1) denote the conditional probability that the ith coin flip is si, when 
the result of the first i - 1 coin flips is sI .. . s,+ 1. Then the probability that the 
source generates x is 
P,(X) = Ws, I sI . . s,~ ~ I )x ... xPr(s,Is,)xPr(s,). 
Since each successive bit is generated by the flip of a coin whose bias is between 
f-E(n) and 4 + e(n): 
(f - c(n)Y ,< p,(x) 6 (t + E(n))n. 
Thus 






We are done by the following elementary calculation: 
(1 + 2&(n))” - 1 = 2nE(n) + o(nE(n)) 
= O( l/n’) for every t > 0. Q.E.D. 
An easy implementation of a high quality source is the following: On input n, let 
XIIXI2”‘Xln; X2,X22”‘X2n;“‘;XklXkZ”‘Xkn be n bit outputs from 
k = o(( l/6) log n) independent semi-random sources. The output is y,, y2,..., y,,, 
where yi = parity(x,,, x2 ,,..., xki). 
THEOREM 5. The source defined above is quasi-random. 
ProoJ: By Lemma 3, the above source is “high-quality,” and thus by Theorem 4 
it is quasi-random. Q.E.D. 
The method described above extracts 1 bit from every o(( l/6) log n) semi-ran- 
dom bits. Next we show how to increase this rate by using a construction of 
Wyner [ 151. Wyner studied the problem of communicating in perfect secrecy in the 
presence of an eavesdropper whose wire-tap channel is noisy; each communicated 
bit is correctly seen by the eavesdropper with probability 1 - 6 and flipped with 
probability 6, 0 < 6 < t. He showed how to achieve secrecy even though the coding 
scheme is known to the eavesdropper. 
The following simple method uses the parity function to achieve secrecy, but does 
not give a good rate of transmission: Encode each message bit m as a k-bit word 
C,Cz”’ ck picked uniformly among k-bit strings such that parity(c, c2 ‘. . ck) = m. 
Clearly m is easy to recover from c1 c2 ... ck. However, the eavesdropper sees the 
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secjuence e , e2 ’ ’ . ek , where e, = ci with probability 1 - 6 and ej= c,~ with 
probability 6. It is not hard to see that H(m 1 e,e, . . . ek) = h($ - & 1 - 2s)k) which 
tends to 1 as k tends to infinity. Let us spell out the analogy between the wire-tap 
channel problem and quasi-random generation from independent semi-random 
sources: the eavesdropper corresponds to the adversary, and the noisy channel 
corresponds to the 6 randomness output by each of the k independent sources. 
Finally the use of the parity function to achieve high entropy with respect 
to eavesdropper sequence e I e, . . . ek corresponds to extracting a high quality bit 
regardless of the strategies of the adversaries. 
Wyner shows how to achieve optimal rate of communication, using parity-check 
codes. We show how to use the same method to extract quasi-random sequences at 
a higher rate. The main idea is to reuse the semi-random bits. Let x1, x2,..., xk be k 
slightly random bits produced by independent sources. Let us extract 1 bits 
r,, r2 ,..., rl as follows: each ri is the parity of some subset of x1, x2 ,..., xk. To make 
sure that the r,‘s are almost unbiased, the subsets must be large, and to ensure small 
correlations, they must be “well spread out.” This is precisely achieved by the rows 
of an 1 x k parity-check code generator matrix (the rows are O/l vectors of dimen- 
sion k, and represent subsets in a natural manner) which detects ak errors for some 
constant a > 0 [4, Chap. 63. An explicit construction of such asymptotically 
efficient codes appears in [S]; for practical values of k, the BCH code is more 
useful, although it is not asymptotically efficient. The following algorithm puts 
together these ideas: 
proc qgen(n): 
Let G be a log n x k parity check code generator matrix, which detects ak errors, 
where k = o( ( l/S) log n). 
Let X,,Xlz “’ Xlm, X2,X22 “’ X2 *,..., xkixk2 “’ xk,, be ffl bit outputs from 
k = o( (l/S) log n) independent slightly random sources, where m = n/log n. 
Let til=xll”.xkl, d~=xl~“.xk2,...~,=xlm”‘xkm. 
Output G .u’, , G . & ,..., G . li,. 
end, 
THEOREM 6. The source defined above is quasi-random. It converts o((1/6)n) 
slightly random bits into n-bit quasi-random sequence. 
Proof: We show that the source defined above is “high quality” and therefore 
quasi-random by Theorem 4. Consider the ith block G. tii. We first prove that the 
parity of any subset of bits in the block is “high quality.” Let u’ be a k-dim O/l vec- 
tor, which represents a subset in a natural way. Then we want to prove that 
i-l/n”(‘) < Pr[v’. G. 3, = 1 ( G. ti, ,..., G. Gi- 1] < 5 + l/n”“‘. v’. G is a k-dimensional 
vector with at least ak l’s, since it is a code word and must have Hamming distance 
at least ak from every other code word, in particular the all O’s vector; so by 
Lemma 3 its mod 2 inner product with the vector tij of independent slightly random 
bits has bias in the range [t-E(n), + + E(n)], where E(n) = ix (1 - 26)“k = l/n”“‘. 
Now we are done by the following lemma [ 141: 
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XOR-LEMMA [Vazirani and Vazirani]. Let k = O(log n). Let x1 ,..., xk be such 
that far every subset SS {I,..., k}, parityies xi has bias in [$ - l/no(‘), 4 + l/no(‘)], 




2 nd’) 2 pm Q.E.D. 
4. LOWERBOUNDS OR THE POWER OF THE ADVERSARY 
We first prove that no algorithm can extract a single bit from a semi-random 
source which is less than 1 - 6 biased. Contrast this to the Shannon coding 
theorem, which says roughly that from any source (whose output distribution is 
explicitly known) one can extract as many independent, unbiased bits as the 
entropy of the source. The difference stems from the adversary nature of the slightly 
random source; its output distribution is tailored by an adversary to thwart the 
unbiasing algorithm. Let f: (0, 1 }” -+ { 0, 1 } denote any arbitrary boolean function. 
We prove that for each such function f, there is a strategy for the adversary such 
that the extracted bit f (x) is 1 - 6 biased. Thus no amount of compression, m, can 
increase the quality of the extracted bit. 
The binary strings of length m are in a natural one-to-one correspondence with 
the root-leaf paths in a complete binary tree of height m. The ith (from the top) 
level of the tree represents the ith bit as follows: taking the left son corresponds to 
ith bit 0 and the right son corresponds to ith bit 1. Each leaf now has a (rl value 
assigned to it by the function j An adversary strategy for the semi-random source 
consists of labeling for each node of the tree: the l-edge with a bias b between 6 and 
1 - 6, and the corresponding O-edge with 1 - b. The probability of picking any root- 
leaf path in the tree is simply the product of the labels on the edges. Thus we must 
prove that for any 0-l labeling of the leaves of the tree, there is a (6, 1 - 6) labeling 
of the edges of the tree such that the tree evaluates to at least 1 - 6. 
THEOREM 7. Let f: { 0, 1 }” --, { 0, 1 } denote any arbitrary boolean function. Then 
there is an adversary strategy, such that f(x) is 1 - 6 biased when x is generated by a 
slightly random source with parameter 6. 
We give below a simple proof due to Mihaly Gereb. In [ 171, we sketched a har- 
der proof; the advantage of the harder proof is that it yields a tight bound for the 
maximum bias achievable by the adversary as a function of the fraction of m-length 
strings on which f evaluates to 1. Two very different proofs (also simpler than ours) 
for the above theorem were suggested by Johan Hastad and Vijay Vazirani. 
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Proof. First we extend the function f to all strings of length at most m as 
follows: 
f(x)= I{YE {O, w-‘“‘:f(xy)= 111 
2” ~ I.4 
Thus f(x) is simply the average value of a leaf in the subtree rooted at x. 
Without loss of generality let us assume that the number of l-leaves in the entire 
tree is at least as large as the number of O-leaves. The following adversary strategy 
gives a bias of at least 1 - 6: At node x, the edge leading to the heavier subtree (i.e., 
having more l-leaves) is labeled 1 - 6, and the other edge is labeled 6. Let 
P(n)= C prCxl(f(x)+(l-2~)min(f(x), 1 -f(x)>). 
IXI =n 
where Pr[x] is the probability that the source generates string x by the above 
strategy. It is easy to check that P(0) 2 1 - 6, and that P(m) is the Probability that 
f(x) is 1, when x is an m-bit string produced by the adversary. Thus it s&ices to 
prove that P(n) is a non-decreasing function of n, to complete the proof of the 
theorem. 
For this we show that for all x of length n, where n < m, the term corresponding 
to x in the expression for P(n) is at most as large as the sum of the terms 
corresponding to x,, and x1 in the expression for P(n + 1). Without loss of 
generality let us suppose that f(xl ) = f(x) + c, and f(xo) = f( x) - c. Then 
WxJUIxI)+ (l-26) min{f(xlh 1 -f(x,)I) 




= Pr(x)(f(x) + (1 - 26) min{f(x), 1 -f(x)}). Q.E.D. 
In Section 3 we showed how to exploit independence between semi-random 
sources to give almost unbiased bits using the parity function. Two questions 
remain: is it possible to exploit this independence between sources to produce a 
totally unbiased bit? If not, what is the closest to unbiased that can be achieved? 
We prove below the somewhat surprising result that the parity function is optimal 
in this regard. 
THEOREM 8. Let f: (0, l}“- (0, l> be any boolean function. Then there are 
strategies for m adversaries such that the bias of f(s, . . . sl) differs at least (1 - 26)“’ 
from 4, where si is a bit generated by the ith source. 
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Proof: By induction on the number of sources. The basis follows from the 
definition of a semi-random source. For the inductive step, fix the output of the 1st 
source to be 0. Then by the inductive assumption, the other m - 1 adversaries have 
strategies which force the bias of ,f restricted to s1 = 0, to be bounded at least 
(1 - 26)m-’ away from 4. Let ~~(0) be the probability thatfrestricted to si is 0, and 
p,(l) the probability that it is 1. We assume without loss of generality that the 
inductively assumed strategies for the m - 1 adversaries yield: p,(O) - pO( 1) = 
A>(l-26)“-‘. Fix th ese strategies for the m - 1 adversaries: 
Case 1. Forfrestricted to S, = 1, p,(O) + A > pi( 1). In this case the first adver- 
sary chooses bias 1 - 6 towards 0. Then 
Pr[O]-Pr[1]>(1-6)A-6A=(1-26)A3(1-26)”. 
Case 2. p,(O) < p,( 1) - A. In this case the first adversary chooses bias 1 - 6 
towards 1. Then 
Pr[1]-Pr[0]>(1--6)A--6A=(1-26)43(1-26)”. Q.E.D. 
It is somewhat surprising that the bound of Theorem 8 is exactly the same as the 
bound proved in Lemma 3. It follows that the parity function achieves optimum 
unbiasing on m semi-random bits. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
We are very grateful to Manuel Blum for raising the issues that sparked off this research, to Vijay 
Vazirani for clarifying several conceptual points, to Sampath Kannan who was a catalyst for the lower 
bound proofs, and to Elwyn Berlekamp, Ashok Chandra, Peter Elias, Richard Karp, Dexter Kozen, 
Steven Rudich, Michael Sipser, and Avi Wigderson for some very useful discussions. 
REFERENCES 
1. M. BLUM, Independent unbiased coin flips from a correlated biased source: A finite state Markov 
chain, in “25th IEEE Sympos. Found. of Comput. Sci.,” 1984. 
2. M. BLUM AND S. MICALI, How to generate cryptographically strong sequences of pseudo-random 
bits, SIAM J. Compur. 13 (1984), 27&299. 
3. D. DENNING, “Cryptography and Data Security,” Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1982. 
4. R. GALLAGER, “Information Theory and Reliable Communication,” Wiley, New York, 1968. 
5. J. JUSTBEN, A class of constructive asymptotically good algebraic codes, IEEE Trans. Inform. 
Theory IT-18 (1972), 652656. 
6. W. KENNEDY AND J. GENTLE, “Statistical Computing,” Dekker, New York, 1980. 
7. S. KIRKPATRICK, C. GELATT, JR., AND M. VECCHI, “Optimization by Simulated Annealing,” Science 
(Washington, DC.) 220, No. 4598 (1983), 671680. 
8. D. KNUTH, “The Art of Computer Programming, Vol. 2: Seminumerical Algorithms,” 2nd ed., 
Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1981. 
9. H. F. MURRY, A general approach for generating natural random variables, IEEE Trans. Comput. 
C-19 (1970), 121fL1213. 
GENERATING QUASI-RANDOM SEQUENCES 87 
9. J. VON NEUMANN, Various techniques used in connection with random digits (notes by G. E. For- 
sythe), Applied Math Series Vol. 12, pp. 36-38, 1951; National Bureau of Standards, Washington, 
DC., reprinted in “Collected Works,” Vol. 5, 768-770, Pergamon, New York, 1963. 
10. M. 0. RABIN, Probabilistic algorithms in primality testing, J. Number Theory 12 (1980), 128-138. 
Il. B. SCHMEISER, Random variate generation: A survey, 1980 IEEE “Simulation with Discrete Models: 
A State-of-the-Art View” (T. Oren, C. Shub, P. Roth, Eds.). 
12. A. SHAMIR, On the generation of cryptographically strong pseudo-random sequences, ACM Trans. 
Comput. Systems 1 (1983), 38844. 
13. R. SOLOVAY AND V. STRASSEN, A fast Monte-Carlo test for primality, SIAM J. Camp. 6 (1977), 
8485. 
14. U. V. VAZIRANI AND V. V. VAZIRANI, Trapdoor pseudo-random number generators with 
applications to protocol design, in “15th Annu. ACM Sympos. Theory of Comput.“, 1983. 
15. A. WYNER, Wire-tap channel, Bell System Tech. J. Oct. (1975) 1355-1387. 
16. A. YAO, Theory and applications of trapdoor functions, in “23rd IEEE Sympos. Found. of Comput. 
Sci.“, 1982. 
17. M. SANTHA AND U. V. VAZIRANI, Generating quasi-random sequences from slightly random sources, 
in “25th Annu. ACM Sympos. Theory of Comput.,” 1984. 
